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If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It
SENATOR DURBIN’S DISASTROUS SOLUTION TO AN
ILLUSORY PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
Under the spotlight and behind a podium stood the
chairman of Coca-Cola, Robert Goizueta, ready to address a
crowd of anxiously waiting spectators.1 “‘The best has been made
even better,’ he announced. . . . ‘Simply stated, we have a new
formula for Coke.’”2 After opening the floor for questions, a
journalist laconically asked, “Are you 100 percent certain that
this won’t bomb?”3 Coca-Cola’s intent was to revitalize its iconic
drink through a revolutionary strategy, prompted by its eroding
market share and a survey that illustrated the population’s
preference for a faintly sweeter cola.4 Yet the journalist’s words
foreshowed an unforgiving array of consumer protest.5
In the spring and summer of 1985, consumers channeled
their frustration through a colorful display of actions meant to
denounce Coca-Cola’s decision.6 The company’s phone line was
targeted; at one point, it was flooded with 8,000 calls a day, in
comparison to 400 prior to the formula change.7 Consumer
outrage eventually reached Mr. Goizueta himself, as one person
wrote him seeking an autograph, stating that “in years to come,
the signature of ‘one of the dumbest executives in American
business history’ would be worth a fortune.”8 Consumers and
musicians protested through the media, as the former poured
“New Coke” down sewers on television and waived protest signs
1 Blair Matthews, Coca-Cola’s Big Mistake: New Coke 20 Years Later,
ARTICLESBASE (Dec. 2, 2008), http://www.articlesbase.com/marketing-articles/cocacolas-
big-mistake-new-coke-20-years-later-666921.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.; see also The Real Story of New Coke, COCA-COLA JOURNEY (Nov. 14,
2012), http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/coke-lore-new-coke.
5 The Real Story of New Coke, supra note 4.
6 Id.
7 Matthews, supra note 1; The Real Story of New Coke, supra note 4.
8 The Real Story of New Coke, supra note 4.
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that read “We want the real thing” and “Our children will never
know refreshment,” and the latter composed nostalgic songs
commemorating the traditional beverage.9 Others expressed
their concern through a less conspicuous avenue, as they
resorted to hoarding the old product.10 The firestorm from Coca-
Cola’s experiment quickly subsided when the original formula
returned to the shelves two months later.11
Similarly, a formula change initiated by Senator Richard
Durbin has impacted the “economics of offering a debit card,”
and is becoming the modern day version of Coca-Cola’s strategic
blunder.12 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, an intricate statute responsible for regulating
the comprehensive sectors of the United States financial system,
was developed in response to the 2008 financial crisis.13 The
Dodd-Frank Bill was later amended to include Senator Durbin’s
eponymous Durbin Amendment (hereinafter Amendment),
though he proposed it “at the 11th hour,” and “[w]ithout
committee hearings by either chamber of Congress.”14 The
Amendment delegated the responsibility of contriving a system
for the regulation of debit card interchange fees, or the fees that
merchants pay to the bank each time a debit card is swiped, to
the Federal Reserve Board (hereinafter Board or Fed).15 The
Amendment reflects the source of discord between merchants
and financial institutions. The former group claimed that
interchange fees were set at excessive levels, while the latter
countered by arguing that they were set at a level proper to
“serve the needs of all parties in the card system, including
funding better consumer reward programs.”16 Prior to its
9 Matthews, supra note 1; The Real Story of New Coke, supra note 4.
10 Matthews, supra note 1; The Real Story of New Coke, supra note 4.
11 See Abbey Klaassen, New Coke: One of Marketing’s Biggest Blunders Turns
25, ADVERTISING AGE (Apr. 23, 2010), http://adage.com/article/adages/coke-marketing-
s-biggest-blunders-turns-25/143470/; The Real Story of New Coke, supra note 4.
12 Ylan Q. Mui, Bank of America Backs Off Debit Card Fee After Consumer
Backlash, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/bank-of-american-drops-debit-card-fee/2011/11/01/gIQADvugcM_story.html
(internal quotation marks omitted).
13 Brad G. Hubbard, The Durbin Amendment, Two-Sided Markets, and
Wealth Transfers: An Examination of Unintended Consequences Three Years Later 2
(May 20, 2013) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285105.
14 Richard A. Epstein, The Dangerous Experiment of the Durbin Amendment:
Congress’ Interchange Fee Limit is a Reckless Exercise in Price Regulation, CREDIT &
BANKING 24, 24 (Spring 2011) available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/serials/files/regulation/2011/8/regv34n1-5.pdf.
15 Id.
16 Zhu Wang, Debit Card Interchange Fee Regulation: Some Assessments and
Considerations, 98 ECON. Q. 159, 159 (2012), available at https://www.richmondfed.org/
publications/research/economic_quarterly/2012/q3/pdf/wang.pdf.
2014] SMOLDERING EMBERS OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT 325
implementation, the free market determined such fees,17 but on
July 20, 2011, in response to its mandate, the Board placed a cap
on interchange fees that cut them, along with bank interchange
revenue, by 55 and 50 percent, respectively.18
Consumers have displayed a robust surge of backlash in
response to the endeavors that banks have taken as a result of
the Amendment’s regulations. To help minimize Amendment-
induced losses, and salvage the debit card business, a collection
of major financial institutions announced that a new fee was
soon to replace a complimentary service for using a debit card.19
Consumers voiced their discontent by harnessing the strength
of social media. Molly Katchpole, a 22-year-old debit card
owner, initiated an online petition in an attempt to overturn the
fee’s implementation.20 Remarkably, it acquired 300,000
followers within 72 hours.21 Likewise, a news anchor harnessed
populist anger by cutting up her card during her broadcast. With
a smirk of triumph, she ordered, “Chris, bring me my
purse . . . give me that debit card” shortly before its shreds were
spread out on the floor beneath her.22 Finally, a hacktivist group
targeted Bank of America’s website to convey its displeasure.23
Although the financial industry abandoned this vexing strategy,
consumer frustration will linger until Congress stops making a
scapegoat of the financial industry and takes a lesson from
Coca-Cola by repealing Senator Durbin’s ill-studied scheme24—
returning to the free market system.
17 David S. Evans et al., Economic Analysis of Claims in Support of the “Durbin
Amendment” to Regulate Debit Card Interchange Fees 30 (May 12, 2011) (working
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1843628 (click “Download This Paper”).
18 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 3; Peter Eavis, Judge Rejects Fed’s Cap on
Debit Card Fees, N.Y. TIMES DEAL B%K (July 31, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/07/31/judge-rejects-feds-cap-on-debit-card-fees/; Richard A. Epstein, The Dick
Durbin Debit Card Fiasco, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.hoover.org/
research/dick-durbin-debit-card-fiasco.
19 Tara Siegel Bernard & Ben Protess, Banks to Make Customers Pay Fee for
Using Debit Cards, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2011), http://nytimes.com/2011/09/30/
business/banks-to-make-customers-pay-debit-card-fee.html?r=0.
20 Molly Katchpole, Who Battled Bank of America, Is In the Running For
Time’s ‘Top 100’ HUFF POST (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
03/29/molly-katchpole-time-magazine_n_1387997.html.
21 Mui, supra note 12.
22 BAC to Charge $5 for Debit Card Use, FOX BUSINESS (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1190993810001/bac-to-charge-5-for-debit-card-use/#sp
=show-clips.
23 Martha C. White, Bank of America Backlash: Consumers React to Debit
Card Fee, TIME (Oct. 3, 2011), http://business.time.com/2011/10/03/bank-of-america-
backlash-consumers-react-to-debit-card-fee/.
24 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 24; Dan Fitzpatrick & Robin Sidel, BofA
Retreats on Debit Fee, Citing Uproar, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2011, 6:13 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204528204577011813902843218.
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In addition to the resulting populist anger, the
interchange cap prompted a panoply of courtroom battles
between merchants and financial institutions. After the
interchange cap withstood a constitutional challenge by TCF
National Bank (hereinafter TCF),25 a financial institution
regulated by the Amendment, U.S. District Court Judge Richard
Leon overturned it. In response to a lawsuit initiated by a
plethora of retailors in mid-2013, Judge Leon’s lambasting
opinion ordered the Board to decrease the interchange cap even
further because it failed to abide with Congress’s intent and the
language of the Amendment.26 However, the Board challenged
the judgment27 and, in the following year, the U.S Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia contributed to the
Amendment’s saga by reversing Judge Leon’s ruling, and thus
salvaging the Board’s initial interchange cap.28
Although the appellate court mitigates the harm of Judge
Leon’s decision, its ruling should not be viewed as a victory for the
banking industry, or even as a balanced compromise between
merchants and financial institutions, because it fails to rectify the
glut of deficiencies that have spawned since the Amendment’s
implementation. This note will reveal these shortcomings by
analyzing the Amendment through an economic, empirical, and
constitutional framework. Specifically, this note will argue that
the Amendment should be repealed because of its detrimental
impact on consumers and small businesses through increased
costs, and its encroachment upon the banking industry’s ability to
operate a profitable debit card business.
Part I of this note provides a rudimentary explanation of
the debit card industry, discussing its key parts and functions,
and its various fees and purposes. Part II describes the debit
market’s two-sided economic framework that served as the
catalyst for debit’s popularity, and paints an overview of pre-
Amendment, interchange fee trends. With that in mind, Part III
explains how the Amendment distorts the aforementioned
economic framework through its objectives, major regulations,
and exemptions, while shedding light on the pitfalls of
international interchange regulation in order to reveal the
unintended consequences of the Amendment’s implementation
upon small businesses and consumers. Part IV summarizes the
25 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2011).
26 See NACS v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. 958 F. Supp. 2d 85, 86-
87 (D.D.C. 2013).
27 SeeNACS v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
28 Id.
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legal battles that have ensued since the Amendment’s application
and the constitutional deficiencies that have yet to be properly
addressed under the U.S. Constitution’s confiscatory rate doctrine.
Finally, this note concludes with a solution that advocates for the
revocation of the Amendment because of the inimitable efficiency of
an interchange fee set by the free market system.
I. THE RUDIMENTS OF THEDEBIT CARD INDUSTRY
A. The General Forms of Debit Systems
Currently, there are two distinct payment systems that
are generally utilized to clear all debit card transactions, “often
referred to as three-party and four-party systems.”29 The former
model primarily handles the authorization of prepaid card
transactions.30 The latter model supports the preponderance of
debit card transactions.31 However, the four party system is
slightly misleading because it comprises five groups: (1) the
consumer, who supplies the debit card as a form of payment; (2)
the issuing bank, which provides the consumer with a debit card
and a bank account; (3) the merchant, who receives the debit
card as payment; (4) the acquiring bank, which processes the
debit card payment for the merchant; and (5) the network—
Visa, MasterCard, and Discover.32 The network serves as the
nucleus by equipping the issuing and acquiring groups with the
framework required to route the entire process.33
The process begins, for example, when the consumer
provides a Bank of America-issued Visa debit card to purchase a
product from one of Apple’s retail stores.34 After the card is swiped
through a card reader, an electronic message containing
information about the dollar value of the purchase is created.35
Apple (the merchant) then relays this message to the financial
institution that manages its Visa transactions (acquiring bank).36
From there, it is forwarded on to the network, in this case Visa.37
29 Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394, 43395 (July
20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
30 Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81722, 81723
(proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
31 Id.
32 NACS, 958 F. Supp at 87-88.
33 Id. at 88.
34 DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING (2d ed. 2005).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 10.
37 Id.
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After the message is read, Visa conveys it to the consumer’s issuing
bank, where Bank of America determines if there are enough funds
for the purchase.38 If there are sufficient funds, Bank of America
returns an authorization message via the converse route where it is
first received by Visa.39 The authorization message is then sent
back to Apple’s acquirer, who forwards it to Apple.40 A receipt is
printed, and the transaction is complete, usually within seconds.41
The cost of the transaction is deducted from the consumer’s debit
account and credited to Apple’s account, minus specific costs linked
with the routing process.42
B. Transactional Fees and Interchange’s Role
The various costs accompanying debit card transactions
that the merchant must pay include: (1) the interchange fee,
which is received by the issuing bank; (2) the network fee, which
is received by the network processing the transaction, and (3)
the merchant discount, which is sent to the merchant’s acquiring
bank.43 The Amendment only regulates the interchange fee,
which is the largest fee that merchants incur after a debit card
transaction.44 Since it would be “a transactional nightmare” if
each issuing bank negotiates the terms of the interchange fee
with each individual merchant, the networks set the fee level.45
Crucially, the method of network-established interchange fees
was considered essential by the Eleventh Circuit in holding
that “the [interchange fee] on balance is procompetitive
because it was necessary to achieve stability and thus ensure
the one element vital to the survival of the [network] system—
universality of acceptance.”46
Unlike debit cards, checks clear at par, or for free, when
they are provided as a form of payment though both forms work
analogously.47 When using either method, the issuing bank does
38 Id.
39 Robin A. Prager et al., Fed. Reserve Bd., Interchange Fees and Payment Card
Networks: Economics, Industry Developments, and Policy Issues 10 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion
Series Working Paper No. 2009-23, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
pubs/feds/2009/200923/200923pap.pdf.
40 EVANS& SCHMALENSEE, supra note 34, at 10.
41 Id.
42 PRAGER, supra note 39, at 11.
43 Id. at 11-12.
44 Fumiko Hayashi, The New Debit Card Regulations: Initial Effects on
Networks and Banks, 2012 FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV. 79, 85 (2013),
available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/12q4Hayashi.pdf .
45 Epstein, supra note 14, at 26; Hubbard, supra note 13, at 6.
46 Nat’l Bancard Corp. v. VISA, 779 F.2d 592, 605 (11th Cir. 1986).
47 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 8.
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not face any credit risk, as the necessary funds are acquired
directly from the consumer’s account.48 Nonetheless, the
interchange fee was not developed merely to burden merchants.
Rather, merchants pay it in exchange for the many benefits that
checks, or cash, do not provide. These benefits include “guaranteed
payment (that is, the elimination of ‘bad’ . . . checks); ‘ticket lift,’
which is a proven increase in sales observed when consumers pay
via card rather than check or cash; and lower labor costs through
a reduction in transaction time.”49
The most essential of these benefits might be guaranteed
payment, because when a check is used as the method of
payment, the merchant stomachs the risk of default—if the
funds in the consumer’s account are insufficient, the shortage
falls on the merchant.50 In contrast, when a debit card is used,
the risk of loss shifts from the merchant to the issuing bank.51
This exchange is preferred because banks, as opposed to
merchants, are familiar with the cardholder’s account.52
Similarly, the same advantages are realized when analogizing
cash and debit as methods of payment. Not only does debit
eliminate the risk of counterfeit money, it also minimizes the
possibility of theft by employees or intruders because debit
reduces the amount of cash on a business’s premises.53 The
success of these benefits is punctuated by the fact that some
merchants only accept credit or debit as forms of payment, as
opposed to cash or check.54 The efficiencies that accompany
debit card payments elucidate why merchants pay interchange
fees, even though checks clear at par.
Additionally, credit card interchange fees are
endogenous because they are used entirely to cover the costs
associated within the system, while debit card interchange fees
are exogenous.55 Though issuers could retain these fees, and
improve their bottom lines, they generally use them to
subsidize consumer checking accounts, which “facilitate[s]
broader penetration of mainstream checking account services
48 Id.
49 Id. (quoting Patrick C. McGinnis,Misguided Regulation of Interchange Fees: The
Consumer Impact of the Durbin Amendment, 25LOY. CONSUMERL.REV. 285, 289 (2013)).
50 Id. at 9.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 10.
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to low- and middle-income populations.”56 Additionally, these
fees are used to fund reward programs and debit cards—there
are no usage fees for having a debit card.57
II. AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK THAT LED TO THE
PROLIFERATIONOFDEBIT
A. Debit’s Two-Sided Market
Regardless of the mutual benefits that both merchants
and consumers experience, Senator Durbin conjectured that
the debit card industry was plagued because interchange fees
were unrelated to the costs of providing a debit card service.58
The Senator’s conclusion, however, overlooks the fact that the
debit market is two-sided:
Every card transaction necessarily involves two users: a cardholder
and a merchant. Cardholders benefit from their holding a card only
if their cards are accepted by a wide range of merchants, and
merchants benefit from the card only if a sufficient number of
consumers use it. Therefore, it is reasonable for the card network to
price differently to cardholders and merchants in order to effectively
balance the demand on the two sides of the market.59
That is, disparate pricing is not an indication of lopsided
competition or collusive pricing, as Senator Durbin suggests.
Rather, it is a sign of an efficient market.60 Unlike an ordinary
market, where “each buyer and seller goes about his business
without caring whether or not other traders succeed or fail,”
both sides of a two-sided market rely upon each other; “the
ability to satisfy one side of the market depends on the
continued participation of the other.”61 For that reason, the
intermediary, or the relevant network, must permit the side
that is less elastic, or less sensitive to an increase in price, to
cross-subsidize the side that is more elastic, or more sensitive
56 Ronald J. Mann, Anticompetitive Regulation in the Payment Card Industry, 7
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 44, 51 (2011), available at http://www.columbia.edu/
~mr2651/Anticompetitive_Regulation_in_the_Payment_Card_Industry.pdf.
57 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 7.
58 See id. at 2.
59 James McAndrews & Zhu Wang, The Economics of Two-Sided Payment
Card Markets: Pricing, Adoption and Usage 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond,
Working Paper No. 12-06, Sept. 2012), available at https://www.richmondfed.org/
publications/research/working_papers/2012/pdf/wp12-06.pdf.
60 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 25.
61 Epstein, supra note 14, at 26.
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to an increase in price.62 The following illustration helps
explain this phenomenon:
[A] traditional singles bar that only attracts male patrons would quickly
go out of business. As an empirical matter, it is far easier to get men to
attend singles bars than women, implying that a uniform price for
drinks for all customers results in an excess of males, at which point the
market can collapse. What is needed is to find a cost-effective way for
the men to subsidize the purchase of women’s drinks.63
Two-sided markets help remedy this enigma. Charge the less
elastic patrons, or the males, greater than the more elastic
patrons, or the females, for drinks.64 So long as the aggregate
prices paid by both groups surpass the bar’s cost of operation, this
example of price discrimination will increase the welfare of both
sides of the market, and allow the bar to operate—the discounted
price will attract women and that, in turn, will attract men.65
The debit card market presented a similar problem, but
on a more complex scale. Before debit’s prevalence, both sides of
the market were missing—consumers did not use debit cards
and merchants did not accept them.66 Naturally, neither side
desired to act as the “guinea pig” because using a card that isn’t
accepted and accepting a card that isn’t used is futile.67 The
networks, or the intermediaries, provided a crucial solution to
this problem: “to incentivize merchants to install card readers,
Visa charged merchants [or the less elastic side] above the costs
of providing the interchange service to them.”68 Though
counterintuitive, the banks, who were the recipients of the
excess revenue, harnessed it to entice consumers through the
form of free debit service and rewards programs.69 These
benefits fostered consumer switching, as customers began paying
with debit, as opposed to cash and check.70 In turn, the network’s
value increased for merchants, as they were receiving more
efficient means of payment.71 By setting different prices, the
networks created a feedback loop that mutually benefited
merchants and consumers, thus incentivizing both sides to
participate and remain in the debit card market. This explains
62 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 24.
63 Epstein, supra note 14, at 26.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 24.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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why the costs of the debit system aren’t divided evenly among
merchants and consumers, and why the prices paid by the
merchants do not reflect the costs of the provided service.
B. Debit’s Pre-Amendment Popularity and Interchange’s
Trend
The proliferation of debit card usage that ensued was
not fortuitous; rather, debit’s two-sided market provided the
networks with a vehicle for enabling debit’s impressive market
penetration. In fact, “debit cards have been the fastest growing
payment method among non-cash, retail payment methods.”72
By the end of the 20th century, debit card usage represented
around 11.6 percent of all noncash payments.73 Yet debit card
usage flourished between 2000 and 2009, increasing from 8
billion to 38 billion transactions.74 By 2009, debit cards
outpaced their credit card and paper check counterparts, and
“became the most common form of payment, whether measured
by dollars or by number of transactions.”75 Similarly, “[d]ebit’s
household penetration has also been extensive; in 1995 only 20
percent of households had debit cards; by 2007, that number
had increased to 71 percent.”76
Debit’s preeminence amid noncash payment methods
and its incontrovertible popularity have not caused interchange
fees to escalate over the years.77 Though Senator Durbin
believes that networks “have incentive to constantly increase
interchange rates . . . [because] . . . [t]here is no naturally-
occurring market force in today’s interchange system that
would ever lead rates to go down,” interchange data says
otherwise.78 As the Federal Reserve has identified, “there was
no material increase in interchange fees between 2005 and
2009.”79 Rather, they were diminishing: “[T]he weighted
average debit interchange fee declined by about 20 percent over
the [2000s] and the weighted average debit interchange fee has
72 Hayashi, supra note 44, at 81.
73 Patrick C. McGinnis,Misguided Regulation of Interchange Fees: The Consumer
Impact of the Durbin Amendment, 25 LOY. CONSUMERL. REV. 285, 290 (2013).
74 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 10-11.
75 Richard A. Epstein, Durbin’s Folly: The Erratic Course of Debit Card
Markets, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 58, 60 (2011).
76 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 11.
77 Evans, supra note 17, at 16.
78 Id. at 15.
79 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 11.
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been roughly constant since 2004.”80 Moreover, the risk of a
snowballing rate effect is irrational because the networks
“compete with each other vigorously in every market in which
they operate” and collusive pricing is prohibited by the
traditional antitrust laws.81
III. ANOVERVIEW OF THE AMENDMENT AND ITS
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
A. The Amendment’s Misguided Objectives and Regulations
Notwithstanding interchange’s downward trend,
Senator Durbin sought to reform an already well-functioning
market by transferring the costs of debit programs from the
merchant to the cardholder. The effect of which has dismantled
the network’s feedback loop, and compels consumers, the more
elastic side, to cross-subsidize merchants, the less elastic side.
Senator Durbin has glossed over this economic inefficiency by
emphasizing the Amendment’s goal of “reliev[ing] merchants
from high interchange fees, which would, in turn, enable
merchants to pass these cost savings on to consumers, who
would see lower retail prices.”82
Though debit cards are subject to the Amendment’s less
controversial regulations,83 the Amendment’s cardinal provision
purportedly achieves this goal by ordering the Board to create a
ceiling for interchange fees.84 Senator Durbin vindicates this price
regulation by underscoring the success of interchange control in
Canada,85 although its market is easily distinguishable from that
of the American debit card market. Rather, an analysis of
Australia’s results with interchange fee regulation is fitting, due
to the substantial similarities between Australian and American
80 Id. (quoting Evans, supra note 17, at 16-18.)
81 Epstein, supra note 14, at 28.
82 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 3.
83 Id. at 15-16. The Amendment has two additional regulations worth
mentioning. First, the Amendment permits merchants to offer discounts, based on payment
methods, and to set a minimum price for accepting cards, not exceeding $10. Id. at 16. The
Amendment’s second regulation requires a concise overview of the two predominant types of
debit card processing: Personal Identification Number (PIN) and signature. Id. at 14. To
authorize a debit transaction, the former method requires the consumer to enter a PIN
number, and the latter method requires the consumer to sign a receipt. Id. Currently, Visa,
MasterCard, and Discover each own one of three signature networks. Id. at 15.
Consequently, the Amendment requires networks to allow merchants to select between two
or more independent and competing payment networks. Id.
84 15 U.S.C § 1693o-2(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
85 Evans, supra note 17, at 20-21.
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regulations.86 The identical pitfalls that are developing within
both countries corroborate simple economic theory: “price controls
have unintended, and unwelcome, consequences.”87
1. The Cap on Interchange Fees
The vast display of economic consequences that have
emerged since the implementation of the Amendment derive
from its most vexing provision, which regulates the price of
interchange fees. Interchange fees are defined as “any fee
established, charged or received by a payment card network for
the purpose of compensating an issuer for its involvement in an
electronic debit transaction.”88 Although the Amendment orders
the Board to fix them at a level that is “reasonable and
proportional to the cost” of a debit transaction,89 the Amendment
does provide some guidance by stipulating which costs to
consider and which to disregard. Specifically, the Board must
differentiate between “(i) the incremental cost incurred by an
issuer for the role of the issuer in the authorization, clearance,
or settlement of a particular electronic debit transaction . . . ;
and (ii) other costs incurred by an issuer which are not specific
to a particular electronic debit transaction.”90 The text’s plain
language insinuates that, in setting a cap, the Board should
consider the marginal costs of each debit transaction, and
disregard the fixed or sunk costs associated with the business,
leaving them unsalvageable.91 In response, the Board decided to
institute “a safe harbor for interchange fees; any fee set at or
below the Fed’s safe harbor is presumptively reasonable.”92
Specifically, “[t]he safe harbor was set as a two-part tariff; there
is a flat cap of $0.21 per transaction in addition to an allowable 5
basis points (0.05%) of the transaction value (and an additional
cent allowed for fraud protection).”93
86 See Hubbard, supra note 13, at 42.
87 Epstein, supra note 75, at 59.
88 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(c)(8).
89 Id. § 1693o-2(a)(2).
90 Id. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(B).
91 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 13.
92 Id.; Debit Card Interchange Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. 43394, 43404
(July 20, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
93 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 13 (citations omitted); Debit Card Interchange
Fees and Routing, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43404.
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2. Small Bank Exemption
However, “small banks,” defined as “those with less
than $10 billion in assets,” are exempt from the regulations’
interchange fee cap.94 Specifically, the exemption allows 99
percent of banks, or approximately 14,500 institutions, to escape
from the Amendment’s reach.95 This two-tiered system provides
small banks with a competitive advantage. For example, small
banks can exploit the pre-Amendment interchange fees they
receive, and lure consumers from regulated banks, by continuing
to provide and enhance their debit card rewards programs.96
Although the Amendment may seek to encourage consumer
switching, it creates an economic problem that could culminate
in a deficient banking system because larger banks are more
proficient than small banks:
A two-tiered interchange system . . . will create distortions and
promote inefficient bank operations . . . [T]hese [exempt] institutions
are likely small because they are relatively inefficient and have
higher costs. If customers switch from large banks to smaller, less
efficient ones, there will be harm to competition and
consumers. . . . The result will be a less efficient banking system.97
Accordingly, the inefficiencies that result from the Amendment’s
small bank exemption swallow the potential gains that derive
from the carve out, because of the cost advantages that large
banks have developed.
B. An Analysis of Foreign Interchange Fee Regulation
1. Canada is a Misleading Indicator of Interchange Fee
Regulation
Senator Durbin disregards this concern, and validates
the Board’s interchange ceiling by highlighting the results of
interchange control abroad: “Do you know what the interchange
fee is in Canada? It is zero,” and it “enjoy[s] vibrant debit
systems.”98 Notwithstanding the fact that Canada and America
vary in a “number of ways that influence the economics of the
94 15 U.S.C § 1693(a)(6); Hubbard, supra note 13, at 17. However, small banks are
subject to the Amendment’s less controversial provisions. Id.
95 Epstein, supra note 14, at 24; Hubbard, supra note 13, at 18.
96 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 19.
97 Id. (quoting Report of Kevin M. Murphy at 41, TCF Nat’l Bank v.
Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-4194), 2011 WL 863916).
98 Evans, supra note 17, at 20-21.
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debit card business,”99 Senator Durbin and other proponents of
the Amendment overlook substantial differences between the
debit cards offered by the banks of each country.100 For
example, Canadian banks issue debit cards that are incapable
of making online purchases.101 Citizens of Canada “cannot use
their debit cards to buy books on Amazon, play games on
Facebook, buy applications on their smart phones, or to
pay . . . on the Internet . . . .”102 Instead, they have to rely on
credit cards or other payment methods for these types of
purchases.103 American debit cards, on the other hand, are
capable of making online purchases.104 Additionally, “[u]ntil
2004, Canadian consumers could use their cards only to pay in
Canada.”105 Recently, Canadian debit cards became functional
at some merchant locations in the United States, but not in any
other countries.106 Contrastingly, American debit cards are
practically operable across the globe.107 Such sharp distinctions
between each country’s regulated product make Canada a poor
model for the American debit payment process.
2. The Dire Effects of Australian Interchange Fee
Regulation
Rather, the proper gauge of interchange regulation is
Australia, as their debit cards and regulations mirror those in
America.108 A review of Australia’s decade-long intervention
exhibits several undesirable consequences. First, interchange
regulation has curtailed bank ingenuity, as the “adoption of
new technology slowed and innovation was stifled” due to a
decreased debit revenue stream.109 Second, the figures show
“that merchants benefitted enormously, while consumer[s]
have paid the price” as “[b]anks began charging consumers
periodic (annual) account fees, checking account fees, per-
transaction fees, and reward program-based fees.”110 Third,
“there has been no evidence that merchants passed their
99 Id. at 22 n.47.
100 Id. at 22.
101 Id. at 22-23.
102 Id. at 22.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 23.
106 Id. at 22.
107 Id.
108 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 42.
109 Id. at 44.
110 Id. at 43
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savings on to consumers.”111 While merchant profits have
increased from the reduction of interchange costs,112 consumers
have felt the repercussions of such regulation as banks have
limited their investment in a valuable product and pushed
losses onto the consumer through the form of increased fees.
C. An Analysis of American Interchange Fee Regulation
1. The Harm to Consumers
Similarly, since the Amendment’s inception, the side
effects of American interchange regulation mirror those of its
foreign counterpart, as the Amendment’s repercussions have
indirectly affected consumers—or the Amendment’s first
intended beneficiary—by curtailing bank “incentive (and ability)
to invest [in] innovation.”113 As mentioned, the “‘revenues
collected from interchange fees are not merely profits for banks,
but rather they fund ma[n]y of the programs and benefits
customers receive,’ including fraud prevention and customer
authentication in particular.”114 Hence, consumers naturally saw
“less innovation in areas such as risk management, security,
loyalty programs, product development, and user education due
to the limited capital available for investment.”115
Additionally, like Australian banks, American banks
have endeavored to push their Amendment-induced losses onto
the consumer because the TCF National Bank court concluded
that, by charging consumers for debit card usage, financial
institutions could “offset any losses under the Durbin
Amendment.”116 However, after failing to institute monthly
debit fees, banks’ instead increased fees for other services that
have not triggered customer sensitivities, though such action
will not provide issuing banks with the proper rate of return
crucial to recover their costs of operations and produce a
profit.117 Nonetheless, consumer checking account rates have
escalated between 21 and 25 percent from pre-Amendment
rates.118 Further, free checking is becoming a rarity: “In 2009,
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 31.
114 Id. (quoting McGinnis, supra note 73, at 303).
115 Id.
116 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1164 (8th Cir. 2011); see also
Hubbard, supra note 13, at 27, 38-40.
117 Epstein, supra note 14, at 28-29.
118 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 39.
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96 percent of large banks offered some form of free checking; by
2011, this number had dropped to 24 percent.”119 Finally, banks
gutted or discontinued their debit card rewards programs: “In
2011, 54 percent of banks were restructuring or terminating
their rewards programs.”120
Perhaps most frustratingly, like Australian consumers,
American consumers have not benefited at the point of sale,
although “[a]s part of their lobbying tactics, giant retailers
promised to lower prices for their customers if Congress passed
the Durbin [A]mendment.”121 Instead, retailers are clinging onto
their “$8 billion annual windfall” derived from reduced
interchange fees, while consumers have yet to see any savings.122
Additionally, consumer outlook appears grim, as a recent survey
disclosed “that only 3 percent of retailers intended to pass any
savings on to consumers, while 41 percent said they have no
plans to pass on lower prices to consumers at all, and the other
56 percent are unsure.”123
2. The Harm to Small Businesses
Nevertheless, the Amendment has not benefitted all
merchants. American interchange regulation has spawned a new
symptom that our Australian counterpart has not experienced:
harm to small businesses—the Amendment’s second intended
beneficiary.124 Though counterintuitive, interchange fees for small
businesses, such as taxicab operators, quick service restaurants,
and coffee shop owners, have risen.125 Pre-Amendment, Visa and
MasterCard provided a small business discount for merchants
that relied on low-cost transactions, as a way of enticing them to
accept debit.126 However, because the networks have responded to
the regulation by extinguishing the low-cost transaction discount,
small businesses are required to pay the maximum ceiling that
119 Id. at 40 (internal citation omitted).
120 Id.
121 The Durbin Effect: Two Years Later Consumers Not Benefitting fromDurbin Price
Control Regulation, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS COALITION, http://wheresmydebitdiscount.com/
the-durbin-effect (last visitedMay 19, 2013) (internal quotationmarks omitted).
122 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
123 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 37 (quoting MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE,
INTERCHANGE AND THE DURBIN AMENDMENT, available at http://www.mastercard.com/
us/company/en/docs/Interchange_and_Durbin.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
124 Id. at 33.
125 Wang, supra note 16, at 169 n.19.
126 Id. at 169.
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the Amendment permits ($0.21 plus 0.05% of the transaction).127
Consequently, most transactions under $11 are now exposed to
higher interchange fees; “[f]or merchants selling small-ticket
items, this means that the cost of accepting the same debit card
doubled or even tripled after the regulation.”128 The egregiousness
of this effect is punctuated by the Merchants Payments Coalition,
as the retailer conglomerate that supported the Amendment
stated: “The fact that the rule let swipe fees increase on many
small-dollar transactions makes no sense . . . .”129
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALDEFICIENCIES OF THEDURBIN
AMENDMENT
The confiscatory rate doctrine, which stems from the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is the primary vehicle
for attacking regulatory rates that cause dire economic
inefficiencies.130 The Supreme Court’s analysis of a plethora of
ratemaking cases has revealed that a regulatory scheme is not
confiscatory if it dictates rates that permit a supplier to recoup its
actual cost of service, in addition to a fair profit.131 Therefore, a
statutory regulation would violate the confiscatory rate doctrine if
either of the following occurred: (1) the regulation is set at a level
that prevents the issuer from recouping a reasonable profit
margin, or (2) the regulation impedes the issuer from recovering
its entire costs of providing the service at issue.132
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Kevin Woodward & Kim Daly, Appellate Court Upholds the Fed’s Rule
Implementing the Durbin Amendment, DIGITAL TRANSACTIONS (Mar. 21, 2014)
http://www.digitaltransactions.net/news/story/Appellate-Court-Upholds-the-Fed_s-Rule-
Implementing-the-Durbin-Amendment.
130 John N. Drobak, Constitutional Limits on Price and Rent Control: The
Lessons of Utility Regulation, 64 WASH. U. L. REV. 107, 109 (1986); Epstein, supra note
14, at 29; Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 20, 27, TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d
1158 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1805).
131 See, e.g., In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968); Fed.
Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585-86 (1942); Amended Complaint at 28-29, TCF
Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. 10-04149 (D.S.D. Jan. 27, 2011), 2011 WL 864074; Brief for the
Clearing House Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, TCF Nat’l Bank v.
Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1805); William P. Barr et al., The Gild That
is Killing the Lilly: How Confusion Over Regulatory Takings Doctrine is Undermining the
Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73GEO.WASH. L. REV. 429, 465 (2005).
132 Brief for the Clearing House Ass’n et al., supra note 131, at 10-11.
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A. The Amendment’s Implementation Sparks Numerous
Courtroom Battles
In reliance on these principles, TCF challenged the
Amendment’s constitutionality under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.133 Specifically, the bank argued that the
regulation was confiscatory because it not only eviscerated
debit card interchange fee revenues, but also mandated rates
that prevented an issuing bank from recovering the necessary
costs associated with the debit card business.134 Striving to
avoid interchange rates that were not compensatory, TCF
moved to enjoin the Amendment, though the U.S. District
Court for the District of South Dakota denied the petition.135
The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision,
reasoning that TCF, and other financial institutions, were not
entitled to the protections of the confiscatory rate doctrine.136
The crux of the court’s analysis is captured by two deceivingly
concise statements: “TCF’s offering of debit cards is not required
by the government . . . . [l]ikewise, there is no monopoly power
assumed to be associated with issuing debit cards.”137
Particularly, the court refused to apply the confiscatory rate
doctrine because: (1) issuing banks are free to abandon their
business of providing debit card services; and (2) issuing banks
lack the characteristics of public utilities, or companies that
have been granted a natural monopoly subject to government
control.138 Rather, the court reasoned that the appropriate level
of scrutiny was the highly deferential rational basis review,
which upholds government action “if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the clarification,” even if it compromises an issuing bank’s
financial integrity by leaving it with a return that is non-
sustainable.139 Congress’s intention “to ensure that such fees
are reasonable and . . . to prevent retailers and consumers from
having to bear” the burden of the debit card system satisfied
this test.140 TCF’s constitutional arguments were at a standstill.
133 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 130, at 4.
134 Id. at 14, 17.
135 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at *1
(D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011).
136 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 2011).
137 TCF Nat’l Bank, 2011 WL 1578535, at *4.
138 Id.
139 Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
140 TCF Nat’l Bank, 2011 WL 1578535, at *4.
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Two years later, Judge Leon reignited the Amendment’s
controversy in NACS v. Federal Reserve, where he ordered the
Board to slash the debit interchange fee below the 21 cents-per-
transaction rate that it authorized in 2011.141 In this case, the
NACS, a trade association representing over 3,700 businesses,
claimed that the statutory cap was too high, and brought suit
against the Board.142 In his opinion, Judge Leon purported that,
in construing the cap, the Board had run “completely afoul of the
text, design and purpose” of what Congress had intended.143 He
noted that the Board’s statutory cap ignored the plain language
of the statute, because the cap accounted for debit card costs
that were prohibited by it.144 Merchants applauded as Judge
Leon’s interpretation of the statute required the Board to issue
new rates between three and six cents per transaction.145
On appeal, Judge Tatel penned an opinion that reversed
the lower court’s ruling, and confirmed the validity of the
Board’s original interchange cap pursuant to the Amendment.
The three-judge panel bluntly expressed its discord with Judge
Leon: “The district court granted summary judgment to the
merchants concluding that the rules [interchange cap] violate
the statute’s plain language. We disagree.”146 After “[a]pplying
traditional rules of statutory interpretation,” the court held
“that the Board’s rules [interchange cap] generally rest on
reasonable constructions of the statute.”147 By confirming that
the Board did not exceed the authority that Congress granted
to it, the appellate court ensured that the interchange cap
would not be reconfigured.
While the holding of the appellate court elicited a sigh of
relief from the banking industry, the Amendment is still, and
will always be, too restrictive because of its “hopelessly
confiscatory nature.”148 Astoundingly, this fact has eluded each
round of litigation that has been triggered since the
implementation of the Amendment, as courts instead focused
141 See NACS v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F. Supp. 2d 85
(D.D.C. 2013).
142 Complaint at 7, NACS, 958 F. Supp. 2d 85 (No. 11-02075).
143 NACS, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
144 Id.
145 Epstein, supra note 14.
146 NACS v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 746 F.3d 474, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
147 Id.
148 Richard A. Epstein, The Improbable Fate of the Durbin Amendment,
POINTOFLAW.COM, (James R. Copland, ed., Mar. 28, 2014, 1:54 AM),
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2014/03/the-2010-enactment-of-the.php.
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on tracing the contours of its regulatory scheme.149 However, if
the Amendment is subjected to the proper mode of analysis, or
the confiscatory rate doctrine, the unconstitutionality of its
price controls will be exposed.
B. The Confiscatory Rate Doctrine Applied
1. The Amendment Enforces an Unconstitutional
Confiscatory Rate
By analogy, Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Engler150
reveals the constitutional deficiencies of the Amendment. In that
case, plaintiffs, who were providers of telephone service, contested
the constitutionality of the Michigan Telecommunications Act,
which aimed to control intrastate telephone rates.151 The Act in
question abolished one of several fees that plaintiffs charged their
customers on a monthly basis and temporarily froze their
telephone rates.152 Plaintiffs argued that the provisions of the
regulatory Act violated their constitutional right to a reasonable
rate of return on their investment.153 In its analysis, the district
court held that the statute “clearly does not guarantee a
constitutionally adequate rate of return for regulated telephone
service providers because it merely permits telephone service
providers to cover costs, and does not ensure a fair and reasonable
rate of return on investment.”154 Simply, the regulatory Act was
unconstitutional because it inefficaciously secured the plaintiffs’
right to a fair profit by merely setting rates “at a level which only
accounts for the cost of providing services.”155
Like the Michigan Telecommunications Act, the
Amendment limits the monetary amount that issuing banks can
recoup for the service provided. As mentioned, the Amendment
instructed the Board to devise a fee that is “reasonable and
proportional to the cost” of a debit transaction.156 In doing so, the
Board was only to consider “the incremental cost incurred by an
issuer for the role of the issuer in the authorization, clearance,
149 See NACS v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 958 F. Supp. 2d 85
(D.D.C. 2013); NACS, 746 F.3d 474.
150 Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
151 Id. at 591.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 594 (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968)) (first emphasis added).
155 Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 257 F.3d at 595.
156 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2).
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or settlement of a particular electronic debit transaction” and to
exclude all “other costs incurred by an issuer which are not
specific to a particular electronic debit transaction . . . .”157
Essentially, the interchange fee cap only includes “the marginal
costs of providing interchange, leaving fixed/sunk costs
unrecoverable.”158 Under the Board’s own evaluation, the Durbin
Amendment will bar issuers from recovering the bulk of costs
accompanying the debit card business:
We also looked at whether we should have a more expansive
definition of allowable costs that would go beyond authorization,
clearing and settlement, and look at other costs that are specific to a
transaction . . . . So things like the costs associated with rewards
programs or . . . costs that [issuing banks] incur to handle card
holder inquiries about particular transactions . . . . Those are costs
that if they were to have been incurred in the check context, the
bank would not be able to get reimbursement of those costs from the
payee’s bank, so because of that we did not put them into the bucket
of costs that would be considered in determining what the maximum
interchange fee initially would be allowed to have.159
Hence, issuers are not compensated for the costs incurred in
relation to enrolling cardholders or promoting debit usage,
customer service, billing, advertising, and promotional
activities.160 Additionally, the Amendment fails to cover the
costs of each debit transaction, or the narrow costs it permits.161
For example, although the Board set the interchange cap at
$0.21 per transaction, costs associated with each swipe have
been projected to be $0.27.162 This discrepancy reveals that the
boards interchange cap will cause issuing banks to lose money
every time a card is swiped. Thus, like Engler, issuing banks
are not only prevented from receiving a “constitutionally-
required fair and reasonable rate of return,”163 they are also
prevented from recovering the costs associated with
maintaining a debit card business.
157 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(4).
158 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 13.
159 Report of Kevin M. Murphy, supra note 97, at 21 n.70.
160 Id. at 21; Epstein, supra note 75, at 65.
161 Report of Kevin M. Murphy, supra note 97, at 21.
162 2011 Debit Issuer Study: Amid Strong Market, Issuers Bracing For Pending
Changes, PULSATIONS: THE DEBIT NEWS MAG. 11 (May 2011), available at
https://www.pulsenetwork.com/pulse/documents/index/serveDoc.html?doc=PULSATIO
NS-2011-05-06.
163 Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2011).
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2. Private Businesses are Entitled to Protection from
Confiscatory Rates
Nonetheless, the TCF court and proponents of the
Amendment have opined that the confiscatory rate doctrine is
inapplicable, even if the Amendment’s regulations compromise
an issuing bank’s business, because its protections are applied
only within the context of public utility companies that possess
monopolistic characteristics.164 This is a dubious argument. Not
only is there a proliferating inclination “to use the word ‘utility’
loosely in referring to many different kinds of regulation
covering a wide range of businesses,”165 140 years of case law has
demonstrated that “any firm legally compelled to sell at a
controlled price, even a firm that cannot be classified as a utility,
is entitled to the protection” of the confiscatory rate doctrine.166
For example, the confiscatory rate doctrine has been
applied within the livestock auction market industry, although
such operators are not public utilities that bear monopolistic
qualities.167 In both Giles Lowery Stockyards v. Department of
Agriculture and Central Arkansas Auction Sale Inc. v. Bergland,
plaintiff auctioneers complained that the rates set by the
Department of Agriculture were confiscatory.168 Particularly,
plaintiffs criticized the ratemaking scheme, opining that it failed
to account for their investment in the business because it
exposed them to unreasonably low rates for their services,
hindering their constitutional right to a reasonable rate of
return.169 In response, the court examined whether the
aforementioned rates allowed for a fair profit in light of the fact
that auction market plaintiffs were “small operations located in
cattle producing areas,” or “small” private businesses “with
investments less than $50,000.”170
164 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at *3-4
(D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011); Lisa Farrell, A Step in the Right Direction: Regulation of Debit
Card Interchange Fees in the Durbin Amendment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1077,
1101 (2011) (citing Barr et al., supra note 131, at 431).
165 Barr et al., supra note 131, at 438.
166 Drobak, supra note 130, at 123 (1986); Epstein, supra note 14, at 29; Brief
of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 130, at 20, 27.
167 See Central Ark. Auction Sales, Inc. v. Bergland, 570 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1978); Giles Lowery Stockyards, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 565 F.2d 321 (5th Cir.
1977); Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 130, at 28.
168 Central Ark. Auction Sales, Inc., 570 F.2d at 726; Giles Lowery Stockyards,
Inc., 565 F.2d at 323-24.
169 See Giles Lowery Stockyards, 565 F.2d at 324.
170 See id. at 324-25, n.5; see also Central Ark. Auction Sales, Inc., 570 F.2d at 728.
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Similarly, other non-monopolistic utilities in the insurance
industry have enjoyed the protections of the confiscatory rate
doctrine.171 In both Keystone Insurance Co. v. Foster and Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company v. Commissioner of Insurance,
plaintiff automobile insurers attacked a declaration that
introduced an auto insurance rate reduction in response to
gradually increasing costs, arguing that the regulated rates
amounted to a taking because they were confiscatory.172 In
considering plaintiff’s rationale, the Foster court held that the
“provision would . . . avoid a confiscatory impact on” the insurance
company if it allowed “a regulated business to obtain a fair return
on its property given the risks.”173 Even more strikingly, the Aetna
court articulated that although the confiscatory rate doctrine “has
been applied . . . to rates for public utilities, it is as applicable” to
plaintiff insurers, although they were comprised of “seventy
companies licensed to sell insurance,” unlike a monopolistic
setting, where a single seller dominates the market.174
When scrutinized in the aggregate, the aforementioned
case law dictates an application of the confiscatory rate
doctrine when a business is legally coerced into selling at a
regulated price, regardless of whether it can be classified as a
public utility with monopolistic characteristics. Hence, auction
operators, various insurers,175 cab companies,176 and a surfeit of
other industries have been shielded by the doctrine, as it
intercepted attacks on their financial integrity through the
form of confiscatory rates.177 Similarly, the application of the
confiscatory rate doctrine is appropriate within the context of
the financial industry, as the holdings of the previous decisions
pierce through the misguided averments of the Amendment’s
supporters, who claim that monopolistic utilities are granted a
higher degree of security from takings.
171 See Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Comm’r of Ins., 263 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1970); Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant, supra note 130, at 30.
172 Keystone Ins. Co., 732 F. Supp. at 37; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 N.E.2d at 699.
173 Keystone Ins. Co., 732 F. Supp. at 36, 38 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v.
Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989)).
174 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 N.E.2d at 699.
175 See Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of R.I. v. Paradis, 756 F.
Supp. 669 (D.R.I. 1991).
176 See Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 919 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
177 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 130, at 32.
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3. Issuing Banks Cannot Practically Withdraw From
the Debit Business
Nonetheless, the TCF court and proponents of the
Amendment misguidedly contend that the application of the
confiscatory rate doctrine is unbecoming because issuing banks are
not compelled to engage in the debit industry, and may avoid the
regulation by abandoning this portion of their business.178 While
some courts have disregarded this point,179 the previous argument
highlights the significance of a business’s capacity to renounce from
a regulated business.180 However, it fails to account for the
consequential distinction between legal and practical barriers.181
While a firm may not be under any “legal compulsion to remain in
business” if “its investments are such that it cannot afford to
withdraw from the price-controlled business without inordinate
financial loss, it is a fiction to justify the lack of constitutional
protection on the basis of the ability to withdraw.”182
For example, in Tenoco Oil Company, Inc., v. Department
of Consumer Affairs, gasoline refineries and wholesalers
challenged the constitutionally of a regulatory statute which
empowered the Secretary of the Puerto Rican Department of
Consumer Affairs to set prices in the former’s business.183 The
refiners and wholesalers filed complaints alleging that the Act
violated the Takings Clause because it set rates at a confiscatory
level.184 The court conceded that the plaintiffs “may choose, over
the duration of price controls, to abstain from selling gasoline
and thus will not suffer any loses.”185 Distinguishing between
theory and practice, the court discussed the economic realities of
a business’s choice post-regulation:
178 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at *3
(D.S.D. Apr. 25, 2011); Farrell, supra note 164, at 1103.
179 Central Ark. Auction Sales, Inc. v. Bergland, 570 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1978)
(holding that the confiscatory rate doctrine should be applied although plaintiffs were
free to cease operating the regulated business); Yellow Cab Co., 919 F. Supp. at 1140
n.4 (holding that the principles of the confiscatory rate doctrine were necessary
although the defendant “argue[d] that there can be no [T]aking in this case because
[plaintiff] can avoid the effect of the” regulatory statute because it is free to stop
leasing cabs and could hire its own drivers instead); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 N.E.2d
698 (holding that a statute regulating auto insurance was confiscatory even though the
defendant’s argued that “if the companies cannot write the insurance at [the
challenged] rates they are free to stop writing it”).
180 Barr et al., supra note 131, at 440; Drobak, supra note 130, at 119.
181 Barr et al., supra note 131, at 441-42; Drobak, supra note 130, at 120, 123-24.
182 Drobak, supra note 130, at 123.
183 See Tenoco Oil Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013
(1st Cir. 1989).
184 Id. at 1017.
185 Id. at 1027 n.21.
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This supposed freedom to temporarily leave the market may be
largely illusory, however. Even if the wholesalers hoarded their
present inventories to be sold when they could obtain a higher price,
they still would have to meet their fixed costs—overhead, salaries,
storage, etc. In practice, such a course might very well be
economically prohibitive.186
The practical and economic barriers that prevented the plaintiffs
from exiting the regulated business influenced the court’s
decision to apply the confiscatory rate doctrine to determine if
the Act at issue confiscated plaintiff ’s property in violation of
the Takings Clause.187
Although issuing banks, like the plaintiffs in Tenoco Oil
Company, are not legally compelled to remain in business,
their position is such that they cannot afford to depart from the
regulated field without exposing themselves to inordinate
financial loss. Issuing banks’ mammoth sunk costs, represented
by the “billions of dollars” invested “to help develop an efficient,
convenient, and secure debit-card payments system,” represents
the de facto facet of compulsion.188 This type of investment
produces assets that are “typically immobile and suitable only to
a single purpose—delivering the services the utility is obligated
to provide.”189 Accordingly, issuing banks are in a vulnerable
position because “[f]irms with investments in specialized assets
are less able to withdraw from a price-controlled business.”190
Therefore, “a government can set lower prices for these firms
with a greater likelihood that the firms will continue to sell
their products at the regulated prices.”191 Hence, the absence of
the confiscatory rate doctrine in this situation would present
issuers with a Hobson’s choice: exit the business and lose
massive sunk costs or remain in the business in return for
revenues that make the service exceptionally unprofitable.
4. Recouping Amendment-Induced Losses is Unfeasible
Alternatively, previous court decisions and Amendment
proponents unpersuasively argue that the confiscatory rate
doctrine is not pertinent to the Amendment because even if
economic barriers exist, issuing banks may remain in the debit
business and retrieve lost interchange revenue by (1) charging
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1026.
188 Brief for the Clearing House Ass’n et al., supra note 131, at 1.
189 Barr et al., supra note 131, at 441.
190 Drobak, supra note 130, at 127.
191 Id.
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their customers for the regulated line of service, or debit card
usage and (2) placing fees for the use of unregulated lines of
business, such as checking account or credit card fees.192 The
illustration in this note’s introduction demonstrates the
impracticability of the former argument, while the latter
argument is precluded by Supreme Court case law.
First, an issuing bank’s ability to recover lost interchange
revenue from its regulated line of business is not constitutionally
permissible, as illustrated by Tenoco. The limited scope of
financial remedy is elucidated by the opinion’s pragmatic
examination of a regulated business’s choice after a rate
reduction: “[a] price regulation which forces wholesalers to sell
[the service] for a price which does not cover operating costs and a
reasonable profit may . . . become so onerous that the wholesalers
will be unable to ever recover their earlier cumulative losses
through subsequent price increases . . . .”193 In such a situation, a
business’s attempt to assimilate into the regulated field by
charging for services that were previously honorary will fail to
“restore value to the investment the wholesaler made” within its
specific industry because of inexorable economic realities, and
“may . . . force[ it] out of business.”194
The court’s abstract language transforms into a
palpable argument when applied to the banking industry, as
post-judgment events have proved that customer sensitivities
will preclude issuing banks from charging customers for debit
card usage. Previously, the Eighth Circuit admitted that it “is
not clear” whether such pressures serve as a restriction, since
issuing banks could possibly offset their losses by “charg[ing]
their customers for the privilege of using their debit card
services.”195 However, after a plethora of regulated banks
announced that they planned on charging consumers for using
their debit cards, the financial industry was engulfed by an
avalanche of consumer condemnation that has prevented the
debit-issuing community from offsetting their losses through
usage fees.196 The substantial drops in stock prices, explosive
consumer outrage, rebellious consumer campaigns, and
192 TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1164 (8th Cir. 2011); Brief for
the Clearing House Ass’n et al., supra note 131, at 23-26; Debit Card Interchange Fees
and Routing, 75 Fed. Reg. 81722, 81733 n.44 (proposed Dec. 28, 2010) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 235).
193 Tenoco Oil Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1027 (1st
Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
194 Id.
195 TCF Nat’l Bank, 643 F.3d at 1164.
196 Bernard & Protess, supra note 19; Fitzpatrick & Sidel, supra note 24.
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dissenting consumer petitions that ensued within 72 hours of
the announcement illustrated the unfeasibility and
destructiveness of a debit usage fee.197 Since the financial
industry’s plan never came to fruition, debit owners have
“contributed exactly zero to the bottom line,”198 and the Eighth
Circuit’s assumption, that suggested that the “issuing banks
could make up their lost revenue somehow by charging their
own customers” for debit card use, has “proved false”.199
However, even if the financial industry disregarded that
unforgiving display of consumer backlash by implementing usage
fees, a Time Moneyland survey exposes another weapon that debit
users could employ: the ability to switch banks, which is what
roughly 75% of those polled promised to do.200 Agitated consumers
have an abundance of tempting options, as the Amendment’s small
bank exemption allows 99 percent of banks to receive pre-
Amendment interchange rates that, in turn, are used to keep debit
card services free.201 While consumers likely are not bluffing,202 the
situation is exacerbated by post-judgment “legislation that would
make it easy for consumers to switch banks and simultaneously
swap their direct deposit, electronic bill paying and other automatic
features.”203 This looming threat is another reason why covered
banks could never recoup lost interchange revenues through debit
usage fees from their customers.
Second, an issuer’s ability to recoup lost interchange
revenue from an unregulated line of business is not
constitutionally acceptable. In Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Louisiana, a non-monopolist dealer of lumber
was directed to operate a railroad in congruence with the
Commission’s proposed schedule.204 Plaintiff supplier alleged
that the order would force it to operate at a loss of $1,500 per
month.205 In turn, the Court inquired whether the lumber
company should subsidize the railroad through its profitable and
197 Ylan Q. Mui, supra note 12; White, supra note 23; Fitzpatrick & Sidel,
supra note 24.
198 Epstein, supra note 18.
199 Epstein, supra note 148.
200 White, supra note 23.
201 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 18-19.
202 White, supra note 23 (explaining “that roughly two-thirds of people who
say that they plan to switch banks do”).
203 Ryan Grim, Bank of America Debit Card Fee Leads to Legislative Response,
HUFF POST (Nov. 11, 2011 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/30/bank-
of-america-fee_n_992623.html.
204 Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of La., 251 U.S. 396, 397 (1920).
205 Id.
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unregulated lumber business.206 Justice Holmes, in a unanimous
decision, opined that the plaintiff “cannot be compelled to carry
on even a branch of business at a loss” though the plaintiff “may
be making money from its sawmill and lumber business.”207 He
continued, “It no more can be compelled to spend that than it
can be compelled to spend any other money to maintain a
railroad for the benefit of others . . . .”208 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs could not be obliged to operate at a loss even though an
unregulated line of their business was profitable. Like the
plaintiff supplier, the fact that issuing banks may be able to
negate losses from below cost rates through other unregulated
lines of business, such as checking or credit, is immaterial. As
Brooks-Scanlon unequivocally holds, government-induced losses
that are confiscatory do not become constitutional merely because
they can be offset through other unregulated lines of business.
C. The Amendment’s Absence of a Judicial Filter Mandates
Legal Intervention
The futility of the various mitigation arguments, as well
as the fact that issuing banks cannot request special relief from
the Amendment, though it is a regulatory statute where “careful
administrative procedures are customary,” further illuminates
the need of labeling the Amendment with a confiscatory mark.
For example, in Keystone, the court hesitated to dub the
amendment at issue with a confiscatory label because it contained
a “‘safety valve’ . . . permitting rate relief” for companies
experiencing “extraordinary circumstances.”209 The court’s
reluctance illustrates its desire to evade needless constitutional
inquiries when the provision at issue permits the regulated party
to avoid a confiscatory impact through a self-help mechanism.
However, this concern is inapplicable within the debit
industry, as regulated issuing banks cannot avoid a
confiscatory impact without judicial interference, unlike the
plaintiffs in Keystone. Yet, proponents of the Amendment may
argue that a constitutional safety valve is implicit within the
text of the Amendment because it discriminates between large
banks, or those who do not need protection, and small banks, or
those that would. Notwithstanding the fact that the other two
206 Id. at 399.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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major regulations of the Amendment do apply to small banks,
the irrationality of this argument is revealed through the
arbitrariness of Congress’s line drawing.210 For example, “[t]he
four largest banks each have assets greater than $1
trillion. . . . By drawing the ‘large bank’ line at $10 billion, banks
with less than 1 percent of the assets of the four largest banks
are subject to the same regulatory regime.”211 Though the
Amendment does discriminate, the vast spread of its reach
abrogates its spurious safety valve, further illustrating the
necessity of judicial intervention.
CONCLUSION: REPEAL THE AMENDMENT AND RESTORE THE
FREEMARKET SYSTEM
Proponents of the Amendment account for the above
mentioned constitutional deficiencies and economic consequences
by clinging onto Judge Leon’s holding, and contending that the
Board’s interchange cap never accurately reflected “the language
of the law or Congress’s intent.”212 If it had, the Amendment’s
goals would have come to fruition, and its ensuing problems
would have been avoided. However, this convenient explanation is
misguided. Rather, the Amendment’s perverse effect is the result
of a thoughtless decision: “[w]ithout committee hearings by
either chamber of Congress, [Senator Durbin] proposed . . . a
price-capping arrangement for debit . . . card interchange fees
that had never been proposed or discussed in the extensive
academic literature on the subject.”213 The various interchange
fee studies that resulted from Senator Durbin’s statutory
scheme undermined the Amendment’s rationality and “the U.S.
Department of Justice stated that it was opposed to regulation
of interchange fees . . . .”214 Accordingly, these unintended
consequences that have emerged are not the product of a failed
implementation of intent, but rather the result of an “out of the
blue” and last-minute amendment that has radically controlled
rates in areas that were never intended to be regulated,215 without
210 Hubbard, supra note 13, at 17-18.
211 Id. at 18 (“Bank of America has $2.3 trillion; Chase and Citi each have $2
trillion; and Wells Fargo has $1.2 trillion.”).
212 Woodward & Daly, supra note 129; Merchants’ Lawsuit Says Fed Failed to
Follow on Swipe Fee Reform, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2011 1:00 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/22/idUS192842+22-Nov-2011+BW20111122.
213 Epstein, supra note 14, at 24.
214 Evans, supra note 17, at 3.
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any thoughtful examination of how debit markets function.216
Even Senator Durbin, who initiated the Amendment’s
implementation, missed an opportunity to blame the regulation’s
perils on the Board, as he “declined through a spokesman to
comment on the consequences of the law.”217
However, the Amendment’s perils will not disappear
through the identification of a scapegoat; rather, the inefficiencies
that have been created by “government intervention in the free
market” will subdue when Congress’s bipartisan voices are heard,
and the Amendment is repealed.218 In fact, Barney Frank, the
Amendment’s coauthor, believes “‘that a free market approach in
[the debit card market] will be better for the economy and all
concerned parties than the current system.’”219 Yet if the opinions
of these bipartisan and third party leaders are not persuasive,
perhaps Australia’s decade-long experience with interchange fee
regulation is. After reflecting on Australia’s interchange
regulatory record, the Government Accountability Office stated
“[i]f the fee limit option were chosen, a challenge for
implementation would be setting and maintaining interchange
fees at a level [that] effectively balanced the costs among
networks, issuers, merchants, and consumers . . . .”220 In other
words, the intricacies of debit’s economic platform significantly
decrease the chances of the government’s arduous task of setting
a more efficient interchange fee than the private market would
produce.221 Hence, the annulment of the Amendment would not
only “restore balance”222 to the electronic market, but also retract
the egregious consequences that have plagued small-ticket
merchants and consumers, all while restoring the efficiency of the
financial system.
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